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DECREASING INCENTIVES TO ENFORCE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: CITY OF
BURLINGTON V DAGUE
MICHAEL D. AXLINE*
"Ultimately, enforcement of the law is what really counts." I
For the past decade, the Supreme Court has been limiting citizen
efforts to enforce environmental laws - despite strong and continued
congressional support for citizen enforcement.2 The Court has limited
citizen enforcement efforts by narrowly interpreting statutes that au-
thorize citizen enforcement3 and by broadly applying defenses to citi-
zen enforcement.4 In City of Burlington v. Dague,5 the Court
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon. B.A., Idaho State University,
1977; J.D., University of Oregon, 1980. My thanks to second year law students Hillary
Wray and Matt McKeown for their assistance with the research on this article, and to
Paul Slovic for his insights on the decisionmaking process.
1. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 743 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint In
The Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 343, 421 (1989)
(concluding that the Court's decisions have been both "activist" and "pro-
development").
3. See, eg., Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987)
(holding that a complaint must allege that defendant is "in violation" of the Clean
Water Act at the time the complaint is filed, rather than that the defendant "has vio-
lated" the Act); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (finding that
prior notice of intent to file a citizen suit is a prerequisite to such suits, even if the
defendant has actual notice through service of complaint).
4. See, eg., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2139-40 (1992) (finding
that plaintiff's allegations of standing were insufficient to show "direct" injury from
government action); Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1634-35 (1992)
(finding that Congress was not sufficiently clear in its waiver of sovereign immunity to
subject federal agencies to civil penalties); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
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continued to impede citizen enforcement efforts by reducing the finan-
cial incentives for attorneys to represent citizens in environmental citi-
zen suits.6 In Dague, the Court prohibited lower courts from using a
"contingency factor" to enhance statutorily authorized fee awards to
prevailing plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits.7
The stakes in this determination are high. Because nonprofit organi-
zations and poor or middle income individuals cannot afford to pay
attorney fees in environmental citizen suits, court ordered fee awards
provide the only quantifiable incentive for attorneys to represent citi-
zens in enforcement actions.' Congress has unequivocally indicated its
support for private enforcement of environmental laws by including
citizen enforcement provisions, including provisions for awards of at-
torney fees, in nearly every major piece of environmental legislation
adopted since 1971.'
The larger a potential fee award, the greater the incentive for an
871 (1990) (holding that plaintiffs must allege use of precise area affected by govern-
ment land policies in order to establish standing); Chevron USA v. National Resources
Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating that courts should defer to agency
interpretation of statutes unless Congress has clearly addressed the precise question at
issue).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
6. The term "citizen suit" refers to a statutorily authorized lawsuit, prosecuted by
private citizens, to enforce a public right created by the statute authorizing the lawsuit.
Such lawsuits can involve either private or public defendants or both. See generally
MICHAEL D. AXUINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN Surrs (Butterworth's 1991) (outlin-
ing the citizen suit process).
7. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
8. Of course, attorneys may decide to represent citizens for non-monetary reasons.
However, Congress correctly concluded that a private enforcement system cannot be
based on the assumption that attorneys will be willing to donate hundreds of thousands
of dollars worth of their time on a regular basis. See, eg., The Effect of Legal Fees on
the Adequacy of Representation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Representation of
Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. for the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1974)
(statement of Sen. John V. Tunney, Chairman of Subcommittee) ("[I]t may well be that
'fee shifting' affords the best means of ensuring that rights provided by the Constitution
and the Congress are not taken away by the high costs of litigation.").
9. See generally AXIINE, supra note 6, Appendix A (listing federal laws containing
citizen suit provisions); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforce-
ment A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34
BuFF. L. REv. 833, 844-51 (1985) (discussing common provisions in citizen suit stat-
utes). The Marine Mammal Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988) and the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988) do not
include citizen enforcement provisions. See generally John E. Bonine, The New Private
Public Interest Bar, I J. ENVTL. L. & Lrno. xi (1986) (discussing private enforcement).
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attorney to accept a citizen enforcement action. 0 As Justice Black-
mun stated in dissent in Dague, by denying courts the discretion to
enhance statutory fee awards to reflect the contingent nature of the
recovery in citizen enforcement actions, the Court impairs the effec-
tiveness of the environmental and civil rights statutes that rely on fee
awards to attract private enforcement counsel.1" The Court's opinion
in Dague therefore means that the legislative goals articulated in the
Clean Water Act, 2 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
13
and other environmental legislation are less likely to be realized.
Although that outcome is consistent with the anti-regulatory prefer-
ences of a majority of the Court, it is counter-democratic because it
replaces the policy choices of an elected legislature with the policy pref-
erences of an appointed judiciary. 4 To prevent Dague from decreasing
citizen enforcement, Congress must now enact legislation expressly au-
thorizing contingency enhancements for fee awards to prevailing plain-
tiffs. This article suggests that a standard enhancement for all
contingency cases would achieve the congressional goal of attracting
competent counsel for citizen suits, without imposing unreasonable
burdens on the judiciary.
I. COMPENSATING PUBLIC INTEREST ATTORNEYS UNDER
FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES
Even the most altruistic private sector attorney cannot afford to
prosecute lengthy and expensive environmental cases without some
hope of meaningful compensation. The costs incurred in litigating Aly-
eska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society 5 illustrate why signifi-
cant incentives are necessary to induce attorneys to accept such cases.
In Alyeska, citizen plaintiffs spent five years prosecuting a case under
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act.' 6 Plaintiffs' attorneys devoted over 4,000 hours and more
10. This is particularly true in the relatively inelastic setting where attorney fees are
the only quantifiable incentive to bring such suits.
11. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988).
14. Reducing incentives to file citizen enforcement suits will also have the institu-
tional effect of reducing the workload of the federal courts, a consideration that would
appeal to the court.
15. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
16. Id. at 242-43.
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than one-half a million dollars (assuming a rate of $125 per hour) to
the case, and ultimately prevailed by demonstrating a violation of the
Mineral Leasing Act.17 The plaintiffs, however, were forced to bear
the cost of the litigation, because the Court refused to order the losing
defendant, who had precipitated the case by violating the law, to pay
the plaintiffs' fees and costs. 8 Instead, the Court held that, under the
"American rule," the losing party has no obligation to pay the costs or
attorney fees of a prevailing party, absent a statutory fee shifting
provision. 9
Citizen plaintiffs usually are either modest-income individuals or
nonprofit organizations who lack the resources necessary to compen-
sate attorneys for work on complex citizen suits. Even if private citi-
zens could afford the legal fees in such cases however, it would be
fundamentally unfair to make them do so. The general public, and not
individuals, reap the primary benefits of this type of litigation."° Both
of these factors were behind Congress' decision to authorize fee-shift-
ing awards to prevailing plaintiffs. Absent direct federal funding for
private enforcement of environmental laws, meaningful private en-
forcement will occur only if the financial incentives provided by these
fee-shifting provisions are sufficient to persuade private sector attor-
neys to forego paying cases in order to prosecute contingency suits.
Although every citizen suit statute contains a fee-shifting provi-
sion,21 these provisions do not specify a rate of compensation. Rather,
they typically provide that awards shall be "reasonable. ' , 22 Courts,
therefore, determine what constitutes a "reasonable" hourly rate to
award successful plaintiffs in particular cases, and in so doing, exercise
significant control over the incentives for private attorneys to litigate
17. Id. at 245 n.13.
18. Id. at 269.
19. Id. at 247.
20. Fee shifting provisions serve both equity and policy goals. They bring a mea-
sure of equity to citizen enforcement proceedings by sparing the costs of litigation asso-
ciated with a case that primarily benefits the public. The fee shifting provisions also
further Congress' policy objectives by providing financial incentives for private sector
attorneys to enforce the substantive programs adopted by Congress.
21. See generally Ruckelhaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983) (stating that
Congress included fee shifting provisions in over 150 federal statutes).
22. See, eg., The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988) (court "may award
costs of litigation [including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees]").
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/9
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such suits. 23
Prior to Dague, the Supreme Court had recognized that there is a
relationship between fee award amounts and the willingness of attor-
neys to accept contingency cases. In Blum v. Stenson,24 the Court
found that Congress had intended the use of "market rate" awards for
prevailing plaintiffs under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976.25 The Court rejected the "actual cost" award approach
because Congress was "legislating in light of experience" when it
adopted the 1976 Act, and specifically referred to prior cases using a
market based approach.26 Under the market rate approach, attorneys
who prosecute citizen suits receive compensation comparable to the
amounts received by attorneys with similar qualifications who are em-
ployed by clients with sufficient resources to pay for services. The mar-
ket rate applies even though the attorneys may be institutionally
employed at a lower rate.
The market rate approach provides some inducement for attorneys
to provide representation in citizen enforcement actions, but the mar-
ket rate approach only mirrors the rates paid in hourly fee cases - it
does not reflect the contingent nature of payment in citizen enforce-
ment actions. An unmodified market rate approach therefore requires
attorneys to choose between traditional cases that are certain to pay a
given hourly rate and citizen suit cases that offer only a possibility of
receiving the same hourly rate.
23. The exception is the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)
(1988) ("EAJA"), which provides:
The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing
market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that...
attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court deter-
mines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.
Id.
While EAJA provides a starting point in calculating fees, it does not establish a fixed
rate and does not specifically address contingency factors. EAJA is only invoked in
suits that do not involve specific citizen suit provisions, such as those brought under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1988), where citi-
zen review of agency conduct is sought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1988).
24. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The Court has explicitly approved the practice of
analogizing to fee awards under the Civil Rights Act when determining the appropriate-
ness of an hourly rate in a citizen's suit. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 560 (1986) (Delaware I).
26. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. at 894-97.
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For nearly a decade prior to Dague, the Court struggled with various
methods of reflecting the contingent nature of fee recoveries in deter-
mining the fees awarded to successful plaintiffs in citizen suits. The
Court's ultimate rejection in Dague of all contingency enhancements
will significantly decrease the number of attorneys willing to prosecute
citizen suits. Unless Congress acts to establish a uniform contingency
enhancement as suggested below, Dague will have delivered a serious
blow to Congress' efforts to strengthen private enforcement of environ-
mental laws.
II. BLOCKING LEGISLATIVE POLICY WITH JUDICIAL
DISINCENTIVES
When the Supreme Court reverses a prior decision, it reveals that its
decisions reflect the policy preferences of the Court, rather than some
neutral, objectively verifiable, legal truth. To reach the result it wanted
in Dague, the Court had to reverse Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley
Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II). In Delaware Val-
ley 11,27 a plurality concluded that although fee enhancements may be
appropriate in certain cases, the lower court2" erred in granting an en-
hanced award under the facts of that particular case.2 9 Justice
O'Connor, concurring in the judgement, concluded that a fee enhance-
ment based on the contingency of payment is appropriate only when
the plaintiff will be unable to obtain representation in the absence of
such an enhancement.30 The dissent concluded that Congress intended
27. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711
(1987) (Delaware Valley II). The Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air and
the United States (respondents) sued Pennsylvania seeking to compel the State's compli-
ance with the Clean Air Act. See Delaware I, 478 U.S. at 546. A consent decree obli-
gated Pennsylvania to establish a vehicle emissions program. The state failed to
comply, but the respondents agreed to an extension of the compliance deadline. Subse-
quent to that agreement, the respondents sued to recover their attorney's fees and costs.
The Third Circuit upheld an enhanced fee award. 762 F.2d 272 (3rd. Cir. 1985) The
Supreme Court reversed. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
28. Delaware Valley II, 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985).
29. Delaware 11, 483 U.S. at 728. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist,
and Justices Powell, and Scalia, wrote for the Court. They determined that courts
could never allow a contingency enhancement, except in "exceptional" cases. Id.
30. Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 733. Justice O'Connor noted the absence of a
congressional prohibition on fee enhancements. According to O'Connor, contingency
enhancement is appropriate if an applicant establishes that "without an adjustment for
risk, the prevailing party 'would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in
the local or other relevant market.'" Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/9
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that courts increase fee awards to account for contingent payment in
all appropriate cases, and that such enhancement was necessary to in-
sure a "reasonable fee" for prevailing plaintiffs in citizen suits.
3 1
Although there was no majority opinion in Delaware Valley II estab-
lishing the circumstances under which contingency enhancements
would be allowed, there were clearly five votes for the proposition that
contingency enhancements were appropriate, at least in some circum-
stances, under fee-shifting procedures.
After Delaware Valley II, attorneys frequently argued for fee-en-
hancements by attempting to satisfy the criteria established in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence. 32 In Dague, the plaintiffs convinced the dis-
trict court that they were entitled to contingency enhancements, 3 but
on appeal, the Second Circuit expressly refused to apply the O'Connor
standard. The Second Circuit found instead that the division among
the Justices in Delaware Valley II left the question of what constituted
adequate grounds for a contingency enhancement unanswered.34 The
Second Circuit therefore applied its own rule.3" Under its criteria, the
Second Circuit noted that the plaintiffs confronted substantial obstacles
in attempting to obtain counsel, and these obstacles justified a twenty-
five percent enhancement.3 6 The Court granted certiorari in Dague to
reconsider fee enhancements in citizens environmental suits. The cur-
rent composition of the Court differs from the Court that decided Dela-
ware Valley II, and the new mix of justices concluded that, contrary to
the votes of five justices in Delaware Valley II, contingency enhance-
ments are never appropriate under fee-shifting statutes.37
31. Id. at 754-55 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens joined Justice Blackmun in dissent.
32. See, eg., Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 903 F.2d 352, 352 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying
the O'Connor standard); McKenzie v. Kennickell, 875 F.2d 330, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(same); Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437, 439 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); Student Pub. Interest Research
Group v. AT & T Bell Lab., 842 F.2d 1436, 1451 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); Spell v. Mc-
Daniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1404 (4th Cir. 1987) (same).
33. See Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d at 1347.
34. Id. at 1360.
35. See Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir.
1987) citing Lewis v. Coughlin, 801 F.2d 570, 576 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that the
proper inquiry was "whether [w]ithout the possibility of a fee enhancement... compe-
tent counsel might refuse to represent clients thereby denying them effective access to
the courts").
36. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d at 1360.
37. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2643-44. As Justice Blackmun points
1993]
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Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in Dague focuses on the pol-
icy implications of contingency enhancements and affords only mini-
mal consideration to the legislative intent behind citizen suit fee-
shifting provisions. The analysis is incorrect in several respects and
result driven in all respects.
A. Confusing the Merits of a Case With the Risk of Loss
Justice Scalia's first concern with contingency enhancements is that
such enhancements would encourage nonmeritorious claims. He
reaches this conclusion by asserting that the risk of loss in any particu-
lar case is a product of two factors: (1) the merits of the claim, and (2)
the difficulty of establishing those merits. According to Justice Scalia,
if courts enhance fees in low-merit cases to compensate for the high
risk of loss in such cases, then the lower the merits of a case, the higher
the incentives to take the case should be.39
out in his dissent in Dague, the contingency award was a minor issue in the lower courts
and in the petition for certiorari. Id. at 2647 n.5.
38. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text for a discussion on Scalia's
opinion.
39. Justice Scalia begins his analysis of contingency enhancements with the asser-
tion that:
The risk of loss in a particular case (and, therefore, the attorney's contingent risk)
is the product of two factors: (1) the legal and factual merits of the claim, and (2)
the difficulty of establishing those merits. The second factor... is ordinarily re-
flected in the lodestar - either in the higher number of hours expended to over-
come the difficulty, or in the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and
experienced enough to do so....
The first factor (relative merits of the claim) is not reflected in the lodestar, but
there are good reasons why it should play no part in the calculation of the award.
It is of course, a factor that always exists (no claim has a 100% chance of success)
so the computation of the lodestar would never end the court's inquiry in contin-
gent-fee cases.... Moreover, the consequence of awarding contingency enhance-
ment to take account of this "merits" factor would be to provide attorneys with the
same incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as relatively meritorious ones.
Assume, for example, two claims, one with underlying merit of 20%, the other of
80%. Absent any contingency enhancement, a contingent fee attorney would pre-
fer to take the latter, since he is four times more likely to be paid. But with a
contingency enhancement, this preference will disappear: the enhancement for the
20% claim would be a multiplier of 5 (100/20), which is quadruple the 1.25 multi-
plier (100/80) that would attach to the 20% claim. Thus, enhancement for the
contingency risk posed by each case would encourage meritorious claims to be
brought, but only at the social cost of indiscriminately encouraging nonmeritorious
claims to be brought as well. We think that an unlikely objective of the "reason-
able fees" provision.
Id. at 2641-42.
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This analysis is flawed for several reasons. First, there is no particu-
lar reason that a contingency enhancement would have to track the
risk of loss. Rather, as discussed below, it need only offer the possibil-
ity of recovering something more than the attorney's usual hourly rate.
If the contingency enhancement is the same for all cases, the merits
become the determining variable, and attorneys will tend to bring cases
that have more, rather than less, merit.
Second, Justice Scalia's reasoning fails to account for the fact that
only successful plaintiffs receive fee awards. A plaintiff in an environ-
mental citizen suit will ultimately prevail only if her case has 100%
merit. Regardless of whether a case may have been evaluated as hav-
ing a 20% chance of success on the "merits" before it was filed, the
case becomes "100% meritorious" once it is won. Any case in which
citizen plaintiffs prevail will provide the "social benefits" of greater
compliance with environmental laws. At that point, counsel should be
entitled to an enhancement at least equal to that provided to the attor-
ney trying a case with "80% merits."'  Absent such compensation,
counsel lacks any incentive to take the difficult cases at the cost of fore-
going paying cases, despite the fact that such cases may actually in-
volve a violation of environmental laws.41
Third, despite the fact that Justice Scalia distinguishes between the
"merits" of a case and the "risk of loss" in a case, he uses the two
interchangeably to support his argument. This sleight of hand allows
Scalia to argue that "high risk" cases are not to be encouraged, because
they have no "merit." But that proposition is not necessarily, or even
commonly, true.
An attorney may believe that a case has 100% "merit" because there
is a clear violation of an environmental law. The same attorney, how-
ever, might also conclude that the "risk of loss" is high, and the
40. The converse is that a case with "merits" of 80% might be lost. In that event,
the case in fact did not have merit and counsel will not be compensated. Justice Scalia's
hypothetical assumes that this 80% case, even though ultimately shown to be without
merit, is preferable to the 20% case that is ultimately shown to be meritorious. Argua-
bly, the contingency enhancement awarded to the attorney who successfully prosecuted
the 20% case should provide a total award greater than that given to the attorney who
successfully prosecutes an 80% case and receives a contingency enhancement, because
the risk of loss is greater in the 20% case, even though both are in the end equally
meritorious.
41. In fact, under Justice Scalia's reasoning in Dague, counsel only will bring con-
tingent cases approaching a 100% chance of success merit, because only those cases
potentially provide the financial incentives presented by cases in which the client pays
on an hourly rate as services are provided.
1993]
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chances of winning the case are only 20%. For example, given recent
Supreme Court opinions which narrowly interpret statutory citizen suit
provisions, broadly apply procedural defenses, and indicate a general
hostility towards citizen enforcement actions,42 counsel might conclude
that success is unlikely, despite a clear violation of the law. By using
the word "merit" as if it is equivalent to "risk of loss," Justice Scalia
implies that all losing cases lack "merit" - an erroneous inference.43
Scalia correctly states that there are "social costs" associated with
encouraging the prosecution of "nonmeritorious," claims. Although
he does not elaborate on what he means by "social costs," the most
obvious cost is the expenditure of judicial resources in reviewing and
dismissing meritless cases. Increasing the potential recovery in high
risk cases can certainly be expected to increase the number of meritless
cases, particularly if the amount of recovery is tied to the degree of
risk.' Increasing the potential recovery, however, also encourages
meritorious claims that otherwise would not be prosecuted, thereby in-
suring greater compliance with environmental laws. Scalia's "social
cost" emphasizes the conservation of judicial resources but at the ex-
pense of enforcing environmental legislation. This preference contra-
dicts Congress' express preference for greater citizen enforcement of
the nation's environmental laws.
B. Risk Spreading and Contingency Enhancements
Justice Scalia's second major concern is that contingency enhance-
ments in effect allow an attorney to receive some compensation for los-
ing cases. Scalia asserts that an attorney will apply the enhanced fee
awards in winning cases to offset her costs in unsuccessfully litigating
prior cases.45 Having made this assertion, Scalia then reasons that re-
42. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text for a discussion on the Supreme
Court's hostility toward citizen enforcement actions.
43. On the other hand, courts are unlikely to rule for plaintiffs in a non-meritorious
case, because that entails finding a violation of an environmental law when in fact none
existed.
44. This possibility is tempered by the fact that environmental cases are expensive
and time consuming. Thus, even with a contingency enhancement, attorneys would not
view such cases as a guaranteed "money-maker." Rather these cases are investments
with variable outcomes, ranging from a complete loss of the investment to complete
compensation.
45. 112 S. Ct. at 2643. Justice Scalia stated that:
An attorney operating on a contingency-fee basis pools the risks presented by his
various cases: cases that turn out to be successful pay for the time he gambled on
those that did not. To award a contingency enhancement under a fee-shifting stat-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/9
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imbursing an attorney for expenses incurred in a losing case is contrary
to congressional purposes, because Congress authorized fee awards
only for prevailing parties."
Scalia's conclusion follows, however, only if he is correct in stating
that the effect of a contingency enhancement is to compensate an attor-
ney for costs incurred in prior losing cases. That premise is incorrect
in the context of fee-shifting statutes. Contingency enhancements do
not compensate counsel for cases previously lost. Rather, contingency
enhancements provide incentives for attorneys to forego paying clients
and accept contingency cases.
If contingency fee enhancements were awarded by courts to compen-
sate counsel for prior losing cases, then presumably less skilled counsel,
who lose more cases, would receive higher awards than skilled counsel,
who win more cases. But since no court has enhanced a fee award
expressly to compensate for past lost cases, there are no guideposts for
determining how a court would go about accounting for prior losses.
Scalia's argument is constructed from whole cloth.
The statutory language of fee-shifting provisions implies nothing
about compensating or not compensating counsel for losing cases when
authorizing payment of "reasonable" fees. Rather, the statutory lan-
guage and its legislative history demonstrate Congress' attempt to de-
velop a scheme with sufficient incentives to induce attorneys to accept
contingency cases and, at least occasionally, forego paying clients to do
so. Without the ability to compensate for the contingent nature of pay-
ment in citizen suits, fee awards are unlikely to provide those
incentives.
C. The Efficiency Factor
Justice Scalia raises two efficiency arguments in support of his con-
clusion. First, he argues that awarding a contingency enhancement in
one case will necessarily require it in all fee-shifting cases, because pay-
ment in these cases is always contingent on winning.47 It is not clear,
however, why this would be inefficient, wrong as a policy matter, or
ute would in effect pay for the attorney's time (or anticipated time) in cases where
his client did not prevail.
Id.
46. Id. Scalia reasoned that if the statutory language that limits fee awards to pre-
vailing parties bars a plaintiff from recovering costs of lost cases, then the language
should also bar a prevailing plaintiff from recovering for the risk of loss. Id.
47. Id. at 2642-43.
19931
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contrary to congressional intent. The award of enhancements in all
cases does not, by itself, impose any additional burden on the courts. It
is only Scalia's assumption that the amount of enhancement should
vary with the risk of loss that would make such enhancements ineffi-
cient. A standard enhancement for all contingency cases would be
both efficient and consistent with congressional intent. In fact, if the
purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to provide an incentive for counsel to
forego paying clients in favor of contingency cases, then insuring a
higher payment in all winning cases is the only realistic way to achieve
that goal.
Scalia's second efficiency concern is that contingency enhancements
would spawn "burdensome satellite litigation.",48 Again, however, the
amount of litigation over fee enhancements will depend on the courts'
formula for determining fee enhancements. The variable formula sug-
gested by Scalia might cause significant litigation. However, a stan-
dard enhancement of ten or fifteen percent, applied in all cases, would
be easy to administer and provide consistency in fee awards. 49 There
are so many variables impacting the risk of loss that it is impossible to
correlate the contingency factor with the risk of loss in a case in any
event. The legislative intent behind citizen suit provisions suggests that
only reasonable incentives for such enforcement are required, and a
standard enhancement would provide such incentives.
In Delaware Valley 11, Justice O'Connor suggested that enhanced fee
awards are appropriate only where the applicant can prove that, absent
an adjustment for risk, the prevailing party would have incurred "sub-
stantial difficulties" in obtaining counsel.5 0 Justice O'Connor also
would require that contingency compensation be determined by the
market, rather than by the nature of the risks involved in a particular
case.
51
This comes close to suggesting a standardized contingency enhance-
48. Id. at 2643.
49. Other commentators have suggested similar approaches. See, e.g., Don Corson,
Note, Attorney Fees And The Contingency Factor Under 42 US.C. § 1988. Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984), 64 OR. L. Rav. 571, 590 (1986) (suggesting an initial set
rate modified based upon data considering whether it attracted counsel to a sufficient
number of cases).
50. Delaware Valley 11, 483 U.S. at 733. In making this suggestion, O'Connor re-
lied on the language of the plurality, which required a showing "that without risk en-
hancement, plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the
local or other relevant market." Id. at 733 (footnote omitted).
51. Id.
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ment. But in Dague, Justice Scalia rejects Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach because it requires a showing that the enhancement was
necessary to attract counsel to such a risky case, while prohibiting the
enhancement from being based on the risks of the particular case.52
This is inconsistent, Scalia argues, because the only way to attract com-
petent counsel is to offer a contingency sufficient to counter the riski-
ness of the particular case - a point he later ignores by prohibiting all
contingency enhancements.53 But the inconsistency in O'Connor's po-
sition does not suggest that all contingency enhancements should be
eliminated. Scalia's premise - that the size of the contingency en-
hancement must "match" the risk of loss in order to attract competent
counsel - is not intuitively obvious. It is more accurate to say that the
size of the enhancement must be sufficient to persuade attorneys to
forego cases that pay on an hourly basis.
III. DAGUE'S LIKELY IMPACT ON CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Private enforcement of environmental laws is an increasingly impor-
tant supplement to the enforcement efforts of administrative agencies.
The inherent tension between Congress' legislative agenda and the ex-
ecutive branch's administrative agenda impedes aggressive agency en-
forcement of some laws. When the two branches are controlled by
separate parties with different agendas, the tension is at its greatest.
Even when the same party controls both branches, however, adminis-
trative agencies will have agendas distinct from Congress'. Agencies
have limited resources for enforcement, and may assign different pri-
orities for those resources than the priorities intended by Congress.5"
52. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2642.
53. Id. Scalia also argues that examining the private sector market to determine a
"reasonable" award in fee-shifting cases is circular. The contingency enhancements of
hourly rates (as opposed to contingency amounts based on a percentage of the ultimate
award) exist only in fee-shifting cases. Id. On this point, Scalia is correct. However, as
Justice Blackmun notes, that problem also exists with market rate awards, which Scalia
accepts. Id. at 2647.
54. See, eg., Dianne Dumanoski & Michael Kranish, President Loosens Stance on
Wetlands, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1991 (regarding President Bush's removal of wild-
life-rich wetlands from protection and opening them to development); Statement of Sen-
ator John Dingell, Chair, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Thursday,
September 10, 1992, at 2 ("upper management at the Justice Department [has] halt[ed]
environmental prosecutions that the Environmental Protection Agency, local U.S. At-
torney's offices, and even the line attorneys in the Environmental Crimes Section itself
think should go forward").
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Private enforcement provides citizens, who are the intended benefi-
ciaries of Congress' environmental programs, a meaningful role in im-
plementing those programs. And private enforcement provides the
only means of enforcing environmental laws against federal agencies,
who are among the worst violators of those laws.5"
Although Justice Scalia's analysis in Dague raises several potential
problems with contingency enhancements, he fails to address whether
Congress' goal of inducing private sector attorneys to accept citizen
enforcement cases can be met in the absence of such enhancements.
Without adequate financial incentives, it is unlikely that legislation au-
thorizing citizen enforcement will be implemented in the manner envi-
sioned by Congress. Absent some form of contingency enhancement,
private attorneys have no financial incentives to accept such cases
rather than cases in which they are certain to be paid. Justice Black-
mun correctly notes in his dissent that the reduced compensation
awarded in citizen environmental suits will induce only the less compe-
tent, underemployed attorneys to accept these cases. 56 Because citizen
enforcement actions are expensive, time consuming, and frequently
controversial, even underemployed lawyers are likely to avoid such en-
forcement actions, at least in the absence of a potential fee award suffi-
cient to overcome the risk involved in taking the case. The decision in
Dague to prohibit all contingency enhancements means that if Con-
gress wants meaningful private enforcement of environmental and civil
rights laws, it will have to adopt legislation authorizing contingency
enhancements.
Numerous public interest attorneys filed amicus briefs in Dague.
These briefs documented the economic reality that attorneys will de-
55. See generally Michael D. Axline et al., Stones For David's Sling: Civil Penalties
In Citizen Suits Against Polluting Federal Facilities, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LrTG. 1, 4-7
(1987) (noting the "enormous problem" caused by pollution from federal facilities);
Nancy E. Milsten, Note, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental Laws
When the Polluter is the United States Government?, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 123 (1986) (ana-
lyzing the problem of hazardous waste released by federal facilities).
56. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2644-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun points out:
If federal fee-bearing litigation is less remunerative than private litigation, then the
only attorneys who will take such cases will be underemployed lawyers - who
likely will be less competent than the successful, busy lawyers who would shun
federal fee-bearing litigation - and public interest lawyers who, by any measure,
are insufficiently numerous to handle all cases for which other competent attorneys
cannot be found.
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cline meritorious contingency cases in favor of hourly-fee paying cli-
ents, because even public interest attorneys need to pay their bills."
This reality is self-evident, well documented, uncontradicted, and di-
rectly relevant to the impact of Dague on Congress' efforts to enlist
citizens in environmental law enforcement. It is also ignored in
Scalia's opinion.
Scalia acknowledges that attorneys consider the "risk of loss" when
deciding whether to accept a case.58 But he does not acknowledge that
the amount of the award is at least as important in the decision making
process as the fact that some award is likely.5 9 He expresses a concern
that an enhanced fee award provides an incentive for attorneys to liti-
gate non-meritorious cases," but ignores the fact that increased payoffs
are necessary to encourage attorneys to accept cases with merit.6 He
57. Brief Amicus Curiae of Alabama Employment Lawyers Association; American
Civil Liberties Union Foundation; Joaquin G. Avila; Cooper, Mitch, Crawford, Kuy-
kendall & Whatley; Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Inc.; Jay-Allen Ei-
sen Law Corp.; Erickson, Beasley, Hewitt & Wilson; Law Office of Alan B. Exelrod;
Law Offices of Richard B. Fields; Ferguson, Stein, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Gresham,
P.A.; Julian, Olson & Lasker, S.C.; Legal Services For Prisoners With Children; Legal
Services of Northern California; Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund; NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; National Employment Law-
yers Association; Patterson, Harkavy, Lawrence, Van Noppen & Okun; Richard M.
Pearl; Prison Law Office; Planned Parenthood Affiliates of California; Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; Public Advocates, Inc.; and Rosen, Bien, &
Asaro at I, City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (No. 91-810).
These attorneys explained that "[i]f contingent risk enhancers were not available to
compensate these private attorneys when they prevail, economic necessity would force
many of them to turn down meritorious cases in favor of hourly-fee paying clients." Id.
58. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2640. Specifically, Scalia recognized
that "the attorney bears a contingent risk of nonpayment that is the inverse of the case's
prospects of success: if his client has an 80% chance of winning, the attorney's contin-
gent risk is 20%." Id.
59. It is a fundamental precept of decision theory that a person considering whether
to undertake an action will consider both the probability of success and the potential
payoff while making her decision. Telephone interview with Paul Slovic, Director, De-
cision Research (September 1992). In fact, Scalia recognizes that the size of the poten-
tial payoff is important, when he argues that the size of the contingency enhancement
would have to "match" the risk of loss in order to attract competent counsel. City of
Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2642.
60. The significant disincentives to accepting citizen enforcement actions, including
the expense, time, and potential community disapproval, discount this possibility. See
supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
61. An attorney deciding whether to accept a case that has "some" or even a
"good" chance of success, is more likely to accept the case if the potential recovery is
$100,000 than if the potential recovery is $10,000.
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also fails to acknowledge that in the absence of any offsetting factors,
attorneys are unlikely to trade a guaranteed hourly rate for even an
eighty percent chance of getting the same rate.62
Plaintiffs in Dague argued that the private legal market is the best
determinant of what constitutes "reasonable" fees in contingency cases.
In the private sector, attorneys who accept contingency cases generally
receive some premium over their ordinary rates.63
Justice Scalia fails to respond directly to this empirical evidence of
the need for contingency enhancements to provide financial incentives.
Rather, Scalia argues enhancements merely duplicate factors incorpo-
rated into the lodestar. According to Scalia, difficulty of establishing
the merits of a case is reflected in the lodestar by either a higher
number of hours expended on the case, or in the higher hourly rate
charged by an attorney capable of overcoming the difficulties in less
time.64 The problem with this reasoning is that even if lodestar
amounts in contingency citizen suits reflect the greater number of
62. Decision theorists have documented the existence of a "certainty effect," which
is a "tendency to overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes
that are merely probable." SLOVIC ET AL. DECISION MAKING (Wiley 1988). Scalia
fails to account for the intuitively obvious fact that attorneys will prefer certain pay-
ment over a probability of payment, unless the probable payoff is significantly higher
than certain payoff. Both Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor note this omission in
their dissents. Justice Blackmun stated that, "the Court's argument is mistaken so far
as it assumes the only relevant incentive to which attorneys respond is the risk of losing
particular cases." City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2647 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Justice O'Connor stated:
[When an attorney must choose between two cases - one with a client who will
pay the attorney's fees win or lose and the other who can only promise the statu-
tory compensation if the case is successful - the attorney will choose the fee-
paying client, unless the contingency-client can promise an enhancement of suffi-
cient magnitude to justify the extra risk of nonpayment.
Id. at 2648 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. Plaintiffs in Dague argued that:
"Fee-shifting statues should be constrned ... to replicate the economic incentives that
operate in the private legal market, where attorneys working on a contingency-fee basis
can be expected to charge some premium over their ordinary hourly rates." Id.
64. 112 S. Ct. at 2641. Scalia argues that an enhancement is unnecessary because:
[Ain enhancement for contingency would likely duplicate in substantial part fac-
tors already subsumed in the lodestar. The risk of loss in a particular case (and,
therefore, the attorney's contingent risk) is the product of two factors: (1) the legal
and factual merits of the claim, and (2) the difficulty of establishing those merits.
The second factor, however, is ordinarily reflected in the lodestar - either in the
higher number of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in the higher
hourly rate of the attorney skilled and experienced enough to do so.
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hours or the higher hourly rates charged for difficult cases, the same
will be true for hourly rates in difficult cases involving paying clients.
Therefore, those factors are not a basis for distinguishing contingency
cases from paying cases, nor do they provide incentives for attorneys to
forego paying cases for cases in which the attorney may receive
nothing.65
Enhancing an "hourly basis" award to account for the contingency
nature of citizen suits, as Justice Scalia points out, creates a "hybrid"
model that draws both from contingency tort cases and from standard
hourly rate cases, and the "hybrid" model lacks a precise analog in the
private sector.
The "reasonableness" of a fee system for citizen enforcement ac-
tions, however, whether that system is a "hybrid" or a more traditional
system, should be measured by whether the system accomplishes the
purposes for which Congress authorized fee-shifting. Does the scheme
stimulate private enforcement of environmental laws? Under this test,
the unmodified straight-hourly-rate lodestar system adopted in Dague
fails miserably.
Legislation authorizing a standard contingency enhancement in fee-
shifting cases is now necessary to replace the incentive system under-
mined by Dague. A ten or fifteen percent enhancement over market
rates would be a modest method of insuring that attorneys who gave
up paying cases to take on citizen suits have the prospect of some addi-
tional compensation for accepting the risk, getting no compensation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision to accept any case will depend upon a variety of fac-
tors. There is little doubt, however, that the attorney's potential payoff
is a major consideration. By decreasing the potential payoff, the
Supreme Court's decision in Dague decreases the incentives for attor-
neys to represent citizen groups in statutorily authorized enforcement
actions. An attorney who is personally committed to the issues in-
volved in a case may assume the risk of nonpayment for altruistic rea-
sons. However, by authorizing attorney fee awards in citizen suits,
Congress recognized that reliance on such altruism could not form the
65. Traditional contingency arrangements recognize that the decision to accept a
case will involve consideration of the potential payoff, as well as the likelihood of suc-
cess. Therefore, the contingency payoff is typically a percentage of the total amount
recovered, and it provides an incentive for attorneys to represent impecunious plaintiffs,
even when the chances of success are low, so long as the potential payoff is high.
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basis for a realistic private enforcement program. 6 The Dague deci-
sion significantly narrows the incentive system established by Congress
for encouraging citizen enforcement of environmental laws. Given the
current composition of the Supreme Court, Congress can expect addi-
tional roadblocks on the path to greater citizen involvement in the en-
forcement of our country's environmental laws. The only meaningful
response to such roadblocks is to remove them with legislation.
66. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to
enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private
citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Na-
tion's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have
the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
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